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Abstract
We extend previous work about general election-related
abuse of UK MPs with two new time periods, one in late
2018 and the other in early 2019, allowing previous obser-
vations to be extended to new data and the impact of key
stages in the UK withdrawal from the European Union on
patterns of abuse to be explored. The topics that draw abuse
evolve over the four time periods are reviewed, with topics
relevant to the Brexit debate and campaign tone showing a
varying pattern as events unfold, and a suggestion of a “bub-
ble” of topics emphasized in the run-up to the highly Brexit-
focused 2017 general election. Brexit stance shows a variable
relationship with abuse received. We find, as previously, that
in quantitative terms, Conservatives and male politicians re-
ceive more abuse. Gender difference remains significant even
when accounting for prominence, as gauged from Google
Trends data, but prominence, or other factors related to being
in power, as well as gender, likely account for the difference
associated with party membership. No clear relationship be-
tween ethnicity and abuse is found in what remains a very
small sample (BAME and mixed heritage MPs). Differences
are found in the choice of abuse terms levelled at female vs.
male MPs.
Introduction
As social media become an inescapable part our lives, the
potential for harm is increasingly a focus for attention and
concern. Among apparent harms are incivility and threat-
ening behaviour, which proliferate in the anonymized and
consequence-free environment of the internet. Where threats
and abuse are levelled at our elected representatives, there
is potential for negative impact on democracy. MPs are in-
creasingly raising concerns about the threats and abuse they
are subjected to, and a third of women MPs have considered
quitting as a result of online and verbal abuse received.1
In 2015 a majority Conservative government succeeded
the previous Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition in the
UK. One of the promises made by the Conservatives was
that they would hold a referendum on UK European Union
membership. This was duly held, and in June 2016, 52% of
voters said that they wanted the UK to leave the EU. With
Theresa May taking on the role of Prime Minister, a further
1https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-politics-38736729
general election was held, in which the Conservatives lost
their majority, and the consequences of the referendum in
terms of a changing relationship with the European Union
are, at the time of writing, unfolding under a minority Con-
servative government supported, via a confidence and supply
arrangement, by the 10 MPs of Northern Ireland’s Demo-
cratic Unionist party. These events were largely unpredicted,
and a climate of division has prevailed throughout.
Against this backdrop, there is a need for a comprehensive
and objective quantification of the extent of the issue. Here,
we provide such an analysis in the context of the Twitter
platform, and cover four separate time periods across five
years, making it possible to learn more about how current
events affect abuse sent, any suggestion of trends, and what
findings remain steady across a range of samples. We focus
on tweets using obscene nouns (“cunt”, “twat”, etc.), racist
or otherwise bigoted language and milder insults (“you id-
iot”, “coward”). In this way, we define “abuse” broadly;
“hate speech”, where religious, racial or gender groups are
denigrated, would be included in this.
A note about gender
Quantitative findings such as those in our work do
not address the complex culture surrounding what it
means to be female, male or otherwise in our society.
Work from the Pew Research Center (2014), as well
as expanding on similar findings about female vs.
male online abuse levels in a random sample, notes
that women were “more likely to be upset” by abuse
received. Indeed, the meaning of threats and abuse
for any particular demographic varies a great deal
depending on factors such as history of oppression,
physical vulnerability and the security of their social
standing. As Chemaly comments in her piece for Time,
“women take online harassment more seriously not
because we are hysterics, but because we reasonably
have to” (Chemaly 2014). This work presents, there-
fore, only a part the story. Pew also find that younger
women, in the 18-24 age range, are disproportionately
targeted; a group not represented in our sample of
politicians.
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But we do not limit our analysis to hate speech. We in-
cluded all manner of personal attacks and threats, but not ob-
scene language (e.g. “fucking”, “bloody”) as it is less likely
to be targeted at the politician personally. In this work, we
build on previous work (Gorrell et al. 2018) by adding two
further time periods; one from late 2018 and a further period
from early 2019. These time periods offer fruitful grounds
for exploration on two counts. Firstly, they provide addi-
tional data on the same parliament as was studied in 2017.
Data from 2015 and 2017 focus on quite a different set of
prominent politicians. In introducing more data from the
same parliament as the 2017 set, we have more grounds for
observing which effects arise from those particular individ-
uals and which transcend them. Furthermore, the late 2018
and early 2019 datasets come at a time when the spotlight
in on the process of negotiating the terms on which the UK
proposes to exit the European Union. So Brexit forms a par-
ticular focus for interest in this work.
Our previous work (Gorrell et al. 2018) offered an analy-
sis of Twitter users who send abuse; for example, how they
compare to other Twitter users in terms of account age, fol-
lowers and so forth. We found important differences sug-
gesting different profiles of those who send abuse. This has
not formed part of the focus here however. Instead of focus-
ing on who sends abuse, in this work we introduce a new
focus in a final section analyzing how abuse terms are used.
This is partly in response to a need to expand further on gen-
der, given that our finding that men receive more abuse in
quantitative terms runs contrary to the common perception.
Please see the box “A note about gender” on page 1 for more
on this. In this work, we also no longer consider threat terms,
but focus just on abusive language.
Related Work
Whilst online fora have attracted much attention as a way of
exploring political dynamics (Nulty et al. 2016; Kaczmirek
et al. 2013; Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson 2014; We-
ber, Garimella, and Borra 2012; Conover et al. 2011;
Gonzalez-Bailon, Banchs, and Kaltenbrunner 2010), and the
effect of abuse and incivility in these contexts has been ex-
plored (Vargo and Hopp 2017; Ru¨sel 2017; Gervais 2015;
Hwang et al. 2008), little work exists regarding the abu-
sive and intimidating ways people address politicians on-
line; a trend that has worrying implications for democracy.
Theocharis et al (2016) collected tweets centred around can-
didates for the European Parliament election in 2014 from
Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and France posted in
the month surrounding the election. They find that the ex-
tent of the abuse and harrassment a politician is subject to
correlates with their engagement with the medium. Ward
and McLoughlin 2017 find similar results to ours, for ex-
ample regarding the greater abuse received by male MPs,
in a two and a half month period running from late 2016
to early 2017; we contribute with a more in-depth explo-
ration of how prominence relates to abuse received, and by
studying four time periods over five years. They consider
hate speech/gendered slurs separately, however, and find that
women receive more of these. They find that most Twitter
abuse takes the form of a reply.
The subject of online abuse of women politicians and
journalists has also been taken up in a campaign by Amnesty
International. Stambolieva’s work for Amnesty (Stam-
bolieva 2017) studied only women MPs, though has been in-
terpreted as indicating that women receive more abuse than
men.2 It found that Diane Abbott received almost half of
abusive tweets targeted at women MPs in the six weeks pre-
ceding the 2017 general election period, far more than any
other woman MP, a finding which was then reported in the
press.34 However we find that Theresa May received almost
eight times as many abusive tweets as Diane Abbott in the
month preceding the election, and more abuse as a propor-
tion of total tweets received. Recent work in association with
Amnesty continues the programme,56 again studying only
women. Recently, the programme has crowdsourced a large
corpus of abuse against women MPs and journalists (Delisle
et al. 2019).78
A larger body of work has looked at hatred on social
media more generally (Perry and Olsson 2009; Coe, Ken-
ski, and Rains 2014; Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and
Leskovec 2015). Williams (Williams and Burnap 2015) and
Burnap (Burnap and Williams 2015) present work demon-
strating the potential of Twitter for evidencing social models
of online hate crime that could support prediction, as well
as exploring how attitudes co-evolve with events to deter-
mine their impact. Silva et al (2016) use natural language
processing (NLP) to identify the groups targeted for hatred
on Twitter and Whisper. Munger presents intriguing work on
automated (bot) social sanctions, (e.g. Munger 2017).
A surge of recent interest aims to detect abuse, hate speech
and toxicity automatically, resulting in increasing availabil-
ity of training data and workshops focused on the topic (Bur-
nap and Williams 2015; Nobata et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2012;
Dinakar et al. 2012; Wulczyn, Thain, and Dixon 2017;
Bretschneider and Peters 2017; Nobata et al. 2016; Waseem
and Hovy 2016).91011 Schmidt and Wiegand (2017) pro-
vide a review of prior work and methods, as do Fortuna and
Nunes (2018). Reported performances vary widely depend-
ing on the specifics of the task. In very recent times attention
has begun to turn to the issue of bias in abuse classification.
Unintended bias, for example being more likely to label a
text as abusive if it was penned by a particular demographic
because that bias was present in the training data, has been
highlighted as an issue in Google’s “Perspective” toxicity
scorer,12 which they have recognized, and the overcoming
2http://tinyurl.com/leaf-blog-wom-harrass;
see also correction at http://tinyurl.com/
guardian-abbott-most-ab
3http://tinyurl.com/guardian-may-abuse
4http://tinyurl.com/guardian-abbott-most-ab
5http://tinyurl.com/amnesty-unsocial-media
6http://tinyurl.com/amnesty-toxic-place
7http://tinyurl.com/amnesty-crowdsourced
8http://tinyurl.com/amnesty-troll-findings
9http://tinyurl.com/alw-workshop-2017
10http://tinyurl.com/alw-workshop-2018
11http://tinyurl.com/alw-stack-overflow
12http://tinyurl.com/jigsaw-unintend-bias
of which is formulated as an explicit objective in their new
competition.13 Whilst unintended bias has been the subject
of much research in recent years with regards to making pre-
dictive systems that don’t discriminate, it has only just be-
gun to be taken up within abuse classification (Park, Shin,
and Fung 2018).
In the next section, we describe our data collection
methodology. We then present our results, beginning with
an analysis of who receives the abuse, before moving on to
the topics that are most likely to trigger abusive replies. We
then discuss some differential patterns in term use, before
concluding.
Methods
Data Collection
The corpora were created by downloading tweets in real-
time using Twitter’s streaming API. The data collection fo-
cused on Twitter accounts of MPs, candidates, and official
party accounts. We obtained a list of all current MPs14 and
all currently known election candidates15 (at that time) who
had Twitter accounts.
We used the API to follow the accounts of all MPs
over the period of interest. This means we collected all the
tweets sent by each MP, any replies to those tweets, and any
retweets either made by the MP or of the MPs own tweets.
Note that this approach does not collect all tweets which an
MP would see in their timeline as it does not include those in
which they are just mentioned. We took this approach as the
analysis results are more reliable due to the fact that replies
are directed at the politician who authored the tweet, and
thus, any abusive language is more likely to be directed at
them.
Data were of a low enough volume not to be constrained
by Twitter rate limits. Corpus statistics are given in table 1,
and are separated out into all politicians studied and just
those who were then elected as MPs. The following time
periods define the data used in this work:
• 2015: 7 April 2015 00:00 am - 7 May 2015 22:00 pm. This
is the month before the 2015 general election, finishing at
the same time as the polls closed; hence the 10pm cutoff;
• 2017: 8 May 2017 00:00 am - 8 June 2017 22:00 pm.
This is the month before the 2017 snap general election,
finishing at the same time as the polls closed; hence the
10pm cutoff;
• 2018: 21 Nov 2018 - 21 Dec 2018. This period includes
the 11th of December when there was planned to be a
meaningful vote on Brexit which was pulled at the last
minute on the 10th of December;
• 2019: 7 Jan 2019 - 6 Feb 2019. This period includes the
meaningful vote in which the government suffered the
largest ever defeat in the house of commons.
13http://tinyurl.com/jigsaw-kaggle-toxic
14From a list made publicly available by BBC News Labs, which
we cleaned and verified
15List of candidates obtained from https://yournextmp.
com
Abuse Classification
In order to identify abusive language, the politicians it is
targeted at, and the topics in the politician’s original tweet
that tend to trigger abusive replies, we use a set of NLP
tools, combined into a semantic analysis pipeline. It in-
cludes, among other things, a component for MP and candi-
date recognition, which detects mentions of MPs and elec-
tion candidates in the tweet and pulls in information about
them from DBpedia. Topic detection finds mentions in the
text of political topics (e.g. environment, immigration) and
subtopics (e.g. fossil fuels). The list of topics was derived
from the set of topics used to categorise documents on the
gov.uk website16, first seeded manually and then extended
semi-automatically to include related terms and morpholog-
ical variants using TermRaider17, resulting in a total of 940
terms across 51 topics. This methodology is presented in
more detail in Maynard et al 2017. We also perform hash-
tag tokenization, in order to find abuse and threat terms that
otherwise would be missed. In this way, for example, abu-
sive language is found in the hashtag “#killthewitch”.
A dictionary-based approach was used to detect abusive
language in tweets. An abusive tweet is considered to be
one containing one or more abusive terms from the vocabu-
lary list.18 This contained 388 abusive terms or short phrases
in British and American English, comprising mostly an ex-
tensive collection of insults. Racist and homophobic terms
are included as well as various terms that denigrate a per-
son’s appearance or intelligence. Short phrases might in-
clude “you” to increase precision, for example “you cock”
rather than “cock”.
Data from Kaggle’s 2012 challenge, “Detecting Insults in
Social Commentary”19, was used to evaluate the success of
the approach. The training set was used to tune the terms
included. On the test set, our approach was shown to have
an accuracy of 0.80 (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.41), with a precision
of 0.70, a recall of 0.42 and an F1 of 0.52. In practice, per-
formance is likely to be slightly better than this, since the
Kaggle corpus is American English.
Data-driven approaches have achieved widespread pop-
ularity through their typically superior results, but with
the increasing real-world use of prediction systems, con-
cerns have recently grown about their tendency to contain
unwanted bias (Hardt et al. 2016; Bolukbasi et al. 2016;
Caliskan, Bryson, and Narayanan 2017). In the case of abuse
detection, an example would be a system that learns from the
training data that men receive more abuse, so on unseen data
uses indicators of a male target, such as a male name, to clas-
sify a text as abusive. Even a simple data-driven approach,
if it has access to all the words in the input as features, is
likely to learn more from the training data than strictly per-
16e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies
17https://gate.ac.uk/projects/arcomem/
TermRaider.html
18Warning; strong language and offensive slurs: http:
//staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/people/G.Gorrell/
publications-materials/abuse-terms.txt
19https://www.kaggle.com/c/
detecting-insults-in-social-commentary/data
Date # MPs Tw. sent by MPs Replies to MPs Abusive Repl. % Abusive Retweets of MPs Avg # RTs
2015 474 59,143 267,867 7,960 2.97% 412,520 6.97
2017 541 49,984 614,691 20,477 3.33% 1,706,102 34.13
2018 501 37,405 1,013,538 30,871 3.05% 1,795,952 48.01
2019 504 36,210 939,982 26,854 2.86% 1,735,576 47.93
Table 1: Corpus statistics
tains to the task. In this work, this would be completely un-
acceptable, as it would make it impossible for us to know
if men really did receive more abuse in unseen data, or if
the classifier was biased. Subtler unwanted bias might in-
clude stereotyping a particular cultural group as more likely
to be abusive, so labelling texts containing certain slang
as abusive even when they aren’t. An abundance of recent
work seeks to address this problem (e.g. (Dixon et al. 2018;
Zhao et al. 2018)), but critics say we are still far from hav-
ing solved it (Elazar and Goldberg 2018; Pleiss et al. 2017;
Gonen and Goldberg 2019). For complete peace of mind, a
rule-based approach offers much more transparency and less
scope for unwanted bias.
However, in order to give a baseline demonstrating the
adequacy of abuse classification performance, we also eval-
uated a convolutional neural net (CNN) approach on the
same (Kaggle) data. Our model contains three major parts.
We first encode the input words with a pre-trained 100 di-
mension Glove twitter embedding (Pennington, Socher, and
Manning 2014). Then we apply a CNN network (Kim 2014)
(kernel size 3, 4, 5, and 100 output dimensions), with batch
normalization (momentum=0.1) to extract the local features
of the input text. Finally, our output layer applies a sigmoid
function for binary classification.
We obtained a result somewhat superior to results ob-
tained by others on that dataset when the competition ran
in 2012,20 with an AUROC of 0.8662. Our rule-based sys-
tem cannot easily be compared directly, as AUROC does not
make sense for such an approach. The result was fraction-
ally better than the rule-based approach, with an accuracy
of 0.8243 and Cohens Kappa of 0.4765. We also measured
the positive class recall (0.4603), precision (0.7780) and F1-
measure (0.5784). Given that this system was trained and
tested on data from the same source, which was longer so-
cial media posts in American English, the result cannot be
expected to carry over undiminished to our British English
Twitter data. We therefore concluded that our gazetteer sys-
tem was acceptable in performance and also more suitable
through its resistance to unwanted bias.
Inspection of errors in the rule-based system reveals
that performance is diminished by coarse language in non-
abusive texts and polite language in abusive texts, but noth-
ing that raised concerns for the results presented here.
20https://www.kaggle.com/c/
detecting-insults-in-social-commentary/
leaderboard
Topic Identification
Topic analysis of tweets is based on reusing the methods
from the Nesta Political Futures Tracker project (PFT). 21
The PFT project focused on real-time analysis of tweets in
the run-up to the May 2015 General Election.
The set of topics we adopted were based around the
UK governments high-level “policy areas”,22 such as pub-
lic health, immigration, and law, although we have extended
this list to include other highly relevant topics including
Brexit. For each of these, we then associated sets of key-
words (e.g. for public health: NHS, nursing, doctors), which
were discovered automatically from the party manifestos
and UK election tweets, then post-edited and extended man-
ually.
Analysis
When we look at the abuse received by MPs there are both
many ways to subdivide the MPs into groups as well as dif-
ferent ways of then analysing the data within the groupings.
Many of the remaining sections of this document focus on a
specific partitioning of the MPs into different groups, be that
by party, gender, or a political stance etc. Within each of the
following sections the level of abuse can, and often is, re-
ported in at least two different ways. One way of analysing
the data for a group of MPs is simply to add together all
the abusive tweets received by MPs in that group and re-
port that as a percentage of the total number of replies to
the same MPs. This gives a single headline figure such as
“3.8% of replies to Conservative MPs in 2015 were abusive”
but completely ignores the possible wide variation amongst
members of the group. An alternative is to determine the
abuse level per MP and then look at the mean value (and
standard deviation) which, for example, shows that a Con-
servative MP in 2015 is likely to see 0.775% of their replies
being abusive.
Both of these approaches, while giving very different
numbers, are equally valid ways of looking at the data, but
care needs to be taken when interpreting the results to un-
derstand how the analysis was performed.
Findings
Findings are presented under three headings. First, who is
receiving the abuse, in terms of gender, ethnicity and polit-
ical position. Secondly, we investigate the topics that arise
in abusive tweets particularly. Finally we look at particular
21https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/
introducing-the-political-futures-tracker/
22https://www.gov.uk/government/topics
Figure 1: Abuse per MP in 2015
Figure 2: Abuse per MP in 2017
abuse words, how they are used differently and trends over
time.
Who is receiving the abuse?
We begin with an overview of the data, that allows an over-
all sense of the targets of abuse and the magnitude of the
issue to be gained, in the context of the political climate. We
then review individual characteristics and their relationship
to abuse under four headings; gender, ethnicity, party and
Brexit stance, before bringing data together in a combined
model.
Overview Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 are also available online in
interactive form,23 allowing the viewer to explore the abuse
received by every MP with an active Twitter account in each
of the four time periods studied. The outer ring represents
MPs, and the size of each outer segment is determined by
the number of abusive replies each receives. Working in-
wards you can then see the MP’s gender (pink for female
23http://demos.gate.ac.uk/politics/itv/
sunburst.html
Figure 3: Abuse per MP in 2018
Figure 4: Abuse per MP in 2019
and blue for male) and party affiliation (blue for Conserva-
tive, red for Labour, yellow for the Scottish National Party
– see the interactive graph to explore the smaller parties).
The darkness of each MP segment denotes the percentage
of the replies they receive which are abusive. This ranges
from white, which represents up to 1%, through to black,
which represents 8% and above. So an MP with a wide,
light-coloured segment tends not to receive a lot of abusive
tweets, but because they receive so many tweets this adds up
to a lot of abusive tweets. An MP with a narrow, dark seg-
ment doesn’t receive many tweets, but when they do they are
disproportionately likely to be abusive.
In the pre-election periods we see a lot of abusive atten-
tion aimed at party leaders. In the 2018 and 2019 periods,
abuse distributes itself more evenly. This is most likely be-
cause in pre-election periods people are focused on express-
ing their opinions about the future leadership of the country.
In 2015, shown in figure 1, abuse was overwhelmingly
aimed at the Conservative party, with the Labour party see-
ing just less than half the amount of the Conservatives. By
2019, shown in figure 4, the abuse is almost equally split be-
tween the two main parties (both receive roughly the same
volume and percentage of abuse). We also see an increase
in the volume of abuse aimed at women MPs after 2015,
not explained by an increase in numbers (the “count” setting
of the interactive graphs24 makes this much more apparent)
though as we will see below, this appearance arises from the
prominence of a small number of women MPs, most notably
Theresa May. Averages per individual tell a different story.
The most notable targets for abuse tend to be males and
Conservatives. In 2015, a few high-profile male figures drew
the great majority of the abuse. Whilst Theresa May gained
prominence in 2017, Boris Johnson was the most notable
target for abuse, as seen in figure 2. Generally, Boris Johnson
has tended to draw abuse. Jeremy Hunt tends to draw abuse.
In 2015, David Cameron received most abuse by volume
and a high level of abuse by percent. In terms of volume, Ed
Milliband also received much abuse, but by percent, Boris
Johnson and George Osborn received more. In 2015, lit-
tle abuse was aimed at women MPs. In 2017, party leaders
Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa May received much abuse by
volume, but neither received strikingly much abuse by per-
centage. The people that were disproportionately targeted
with abuse were Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt. James
Heappey, whilst not receiving a great deal of abuse by vol-
ume was disproportionately targeted by abuse, in the wake
of an unpopular comment to a Scottish schoolgirl. Michael
Gove was also disproportionately targeted.
Diane Abbott received a particularly high volume and per-
centage of abuse in the late 2018 period, shown in figure 3,
having not been highly targeted in the previous samples. Ms
Abbott made a controversial comment about policing around
this time, which drew ire from the right and was picked up
in a Breitbart article. This perhaps highlights that abuse can
vary with current events, and certain sample periods may
not be representative of particular individuals’ experience.
There is reduced attention on party leaders compared with
previous years. Lloyd Russell-Moyle announced his HIV
status in this time period. Priti Patel received criticism dur-
ing this time period for a comment regarding food shortages
and Ireland. Several women attract significant volumes of
abuse in this period, and the two individuals receiving the
highest levels of abuse by percentage are Labour politicians.
Theresa May receives remarkably little abusive attention
during the early 2019 period; Jeremy Corbyn receives more
abuse by volume and percentage. But generally, in this pe-
riod the abuse is distributed. David Lammy receives more
abuse than Theresa May in this period, following from a
race row, and Jeremy Hunt and Stewart McDonald receive
the highest percentages. Jeremy Hunt tends to receive high
levels of abuse; Stewart McDonald was the target of far-right
attention.
Whilst this view is useful in understanding the amount of
abuse individual politicians receive in absolute terms, it is
less valuable in illustrating the different responses the par-
ties and genders receive overall, because individual effects
dominate the picture. Therefore it is important to also see the
results per-MP. The online version of these graphs includes a
“count” view in which each segment of the outer ring repre-
24http://demos.gate.ac.uk/politics/itv/
sunburst.html
Date Female Male Is significant
2015 0.570 (σ = 0.966) 0.746 (σ = 1.144) No (p = 0.289)
2017 0.849 (σ = 1.055) 1.464 (σ = 2.406) Yes (p<0.01)
2018 1.289 (σ = 2.198) 1.832 (σ = 1.815) Yes (p<0.001)
2019 1.093 (σ = 1.230) 1.601 (σ = 1.772) Yes (p<0.01)
Table 2: Abusive tweets per 100 responses (Mean Value)
sents a single MP. It is evident at a glance that replies to male
Conservative MPs are proportionally more abusive, with fe-
male Conservative MPs not far behind, an impression that
will be further explored statistically below. We take gender,
ethnicity, party and Brexit stance in turn, before using struc-
tural equation modelling to propose a combined model.
Gender Across all four time periods, male politicians
on average receive more abuse than their female peers,
as shown in table 2. In 2015, the difference between the
genders was small with female MPs receiving just over 1
abuse tweet in every 200 responses, compared to the 1.4
per 200 abusive responses received by male MPs, and in
fact, the difference was not statistically significant (using
a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test). Since 2017, how-
ever, the difference in abuse between male and female MPs
has widened slightly and is enough to show a consistent sta-
tistically significant difference.
This analysis compares average abuse received by a fe-
male or a male MP, whereas the sunburst diagrams above
show results dominated by a few high profile individuals, so
gives a more cautious impression. In the section “Combined
Model” below, we are able to abstract out how high profile
an MP is, how popular they are on Twitter (in terms of tweets
received) and how engaged they are on Twitter. This model
also confirms the findings here. Only male and female gen-
der identities are represented in our sample.
It is worth noting that the difference between the genders
also appears to hold when viewed at the party level, as shown
in figure 5. In fact the only occasion when female members
of a party received more abuse than their male colleagues
was for the Liberal Democrats during the 2018 period. In all
other periods male MPs received more abuse than the female
MPs of the same party.
Ethnicity We classified each MP as being either white or
BAME (Black, Asian, or minority ethnic, including mixed-
heritage) and then looked at the abuse each class received.
While there were differences in the level of abuse, not only
was it not significant, but the class with the higher level of
abuse varied across the four time periods, as shown in ta-
ble 3. This lack of demonstrable difference could arise from
the small percentage (below 10%) of MPs falling within the
BAME/mixed-heritage grouping (34, 46, 42 and 43 for each
time period respectively). Other factors such as gender and
party membership could also affect the overall figure.
Party Abuse when viewed by party alone is not as clear-
cut as some of the other analysis. Firstly outside the main
two parties the number of MPs in a party is small (rela-
tively speaking) and not all MPs use Twitter. This has the
effect of reducing some parties to just one or two MPs for
Figure 5: Abuse per Gender per Party
Date BAME White Is significant
2015 0.835 (σ = 1.023) 0.678 (σ = 1.097) No (p = 0.220)
2017 1.096 (σ = 1.045) 1.274 (σ = 2.146) No (p=0.517)
2018 2.206 (σ = 4.058) 1.601 (σ = 1.658) No (p=0.886)
2019 1.352 (σ = 1.477) 1.439 (σ = 1.642) No (p=0.684)
Table 3: Abusive tweets per 100 responses (Mean Value)
this analysis, and often they also receive few replies in total.
This means that even a single abusive reply can have a huge
impact on the percentage of abuse they appear to receive.
For example, in 2015 2.4% of replies to Liberal Democrat
MPs were classified as abusive. However, if one looks at
the raw data (this is also evident through the per MP sun-
burst diagrams) this equated to just 335 out of 13,947 tweets.
This hardly compares to the roughly similar level of abusive
replies (2.5%) sent to the Labour party over the same period,
which was made up of 2,623 abusive tweets out of a total of
106,080 replies. In order to communicate this uncertainty in
figure 6, we have added a red bar that indicates how the re-
sult would change if that party received three more or three
less abusive tweets. It is evident that the impact on the re-
sult for the Conservative and Labour parties is insignificant,
whereas for smaller parties a few tweets here and there could
change the result substantially. Therefore bars with small or
invisible ranges should be considered more reliable.
Proceeding, we focus on just the main two parties who
have larger numbers of MPs, so we can start to examine
the differences for statistical significance. Specifically, if we
look at the mean number of abusive tweets an MP could ex-
pect to see depending on which party they belong to, then
across all four years, Conservative MPs are likely to see
more abuse, and this difference is statistically significant in
three out of the four periods, as shown in table 4. A possible
explanation for this is that, as the party in power, the Con-
Date Conserv. Party Labour Party Is signif.
2015 0.775 (σ = 1.282) 0.583 (σ = 0.759) No (p=0.993)
2017 1.580 (σ = 2.629) 0.913 (σ = 1.071) Yes (p=0.01)
2018 2.061 (σ = 2.242) 1.231 (σ = 1.526) Yes (p<0.001)
2019 1.646 (σ = 1.889) 1.193 (σ = 1.152) Borderline
(p=0.071)
Table 4: Abusive tweets per 100 responses (Mean Value)
servatives will be held responsible to a greater extent than
the opposition for anything that aggrieves people enough to
author an abusive tweet.
It is also worth noting that the periods from 2017 onwards
are based on a different set of MPs from those in the 2015
period, due to the snap election held in 2017. This slight dif-
ference in the makeup of parliament might explain the dif-
ference in abuse levels before and after the 2017 election, as
well as the emergence of Brexit and Europe as highly polar-
izing topics. We will return to the latter point in subsequent
sections.
Brexit Stance We now consider Brexit stance as a factor
that might influence the amount of abuse received. There are
many ways in which we could have labelled MPs as either
for or against Brexit, but we choose to focus on how they
publicly stated they intended to vote in the referendum. We
used a list produced by the Guardian for this classification,
although clearly not everyone had a stated position.25
In the post referendum periods we can see that in general
abuse aimed at those who wanted to leave the EU and hence
back Brexit has continually increased, as shown in table 5,
whereas the abuse aimed at remainers has stayed at more or
25https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/ng-interactive/2016/feb/23/
how-will-your-mp-vote-in-the-eu-referendum
Figure 6: Abuse per Party
Date Remainer Leaver Is significant
2015 0.573 (σ = 0.819) 0.904 (σ = 1.482) No (p=0.493)
2017 1.234 (σ = 1.640) 1.348 (σ = 1.778) No (p=0.979)
2018 1.480 (σ = 1.470) 1.758 (σ = 1.730) No (p=0.306)
2019 1.313 (σ = 1.254) 1.856 (σ = 2.440) No (p=0.714)
Table 5: Abusive tweets per 100 responses (Mean Value)
less the same level. However, the differences are not statis-
tically significant. Furthermore, we also split the MPs in the
same way for 2015, which was before the referendum, and
before many MPs would have had a publicly stated position.
In that case, leavers still received more abuse than remain-
ers, suggesting that Brexit stance is not causative, but insofar
as there is a tendency for leavers to receive more abuse, this
arises from other factors, for example gender or party mem-
bership. These connections are explored below.
Combined Model Because factors interact, for example
women are more likely to be in the Labour party, it can be
hard to separate out what is causing particular effects; are
women attracting less abuse, or are Labour party members
attracting less abuse? Structural equation modelling enables
a model relating the various factors to be tested for its fit to
the data, allowing the influence of certain factors to be re-
moved from others to give a clearer picture. In our earlier
research (Gorrell et al. 2018), this allowed us to determine
that whilst people more in the public eye (according to their
being more searched for on Google) do attract more abuse,
that is purely a numbers effect arising from them getting
more tweets in general. In fact, people much in the public
eye get less abuse than you might expect.
Trying the same model across four time periods offers
an opportunity to test the robustness of previous findings.
Structural equation modelling (see Hox and Bechger (2007)
for an introduction) was therefore again used to broadly re-
late three main factors with the amount of abuse received:
prominence, Twitter prominence (which we hypothesise dif-
fers from prominence generally) and Twitter engagement.
We obtained Google Trends data for the politicians in each
of the time periods, and used this variable as a measure of
how high-profile that individual is in the minds of the public
at the time in question. Search counts were totalled to pro-
vide a figure. We used number of tweets sent by that politi-
cian as a measure of their Twitter engagement, and tweets
received as a measure of how high-profile that person is on
Twitter. The model in figure 7, in addition to proposing that
the amount of abuse received follows from these three main
factors, also hypothesises that the amount of attention a per-
son receives on Twitter is related to their prominence more
generally, and that their engagement with Twitter might get
them more attention, both on Twitter and beyond it. It is un-
avoidably only a partial attempt to describe why a person
receives the abuse they do, since it is hard to capture fac-
tors specific to that person, such as any recent allegations
concerning them, in a measure. The model was fitted using
Lavaan.26
As previously, we attempted to build a model that includes
the personal factors of gender, ethnicity, party and Brexit
stance. However, a satisfactory model could not be con-
verged. The only result that remains solid across all datasets
is similar to our previous model but includes only gender
as an influential personal factor on abuse received; not eth-
nicity, party membership or Brexit stance. This may suggest
that an effect due to party membership is lost where promi-
nence is included as a factor. However, the fact that a similar
model fits across as many as four separate time periods lends
support to the main findings in the earlier work.
Whilst it wasn’t possible to fit a model explaining e.g.
26http://lavaan.ugent.be/
Brexit stance in terms of gender, ethnicity and party mem-
bership, from the available variables, the reader may find
it informative to learn the correlations between these vari-
ables. Regarding the relationship between personal charac-
teristics and politics, BAME membership correlates with
Labour Party membership to the tune of 0.124 (Spearman,
p<0.0001) and negatively with Conservative Party mem-
bership to a lesser extent (-0.067, p<0.005). BAME mem-
bership correlates positively with female gender (0.123,
p<0.0001). Female gender correlates positively with Labour
Party membership (0.240, p<0.0001) and negatively with
Conservative Party membership (-0.199, p<0.0001). This
group of relationships suggests women and ethnic minori-
ties are drawn to the Labour party in an additive fashion. The
correlation between BAME membership and female gender
may suggest an interaction in which such cross-sectional in-
dividuals are drawn to politics, but to test this we would
need a sample of non-politicians. Regarding Brexit posi-
tion, Labour Party members are more likely to be remain-
ers (0.359, p<0.0001) and Conservative Party members are
more likely to be Leavers (0.307, p<0.0001); party is by far
the strongest predictor of Brexit stance.
The graphs in figure 7 show, for each time period, the
new, simpler SEM model. Polarity of the number on the
connectors gives the regression between those two quanti-
ties. Two asterisks indicate that the relationship is signifi-
cant at p<0.01 and one asterisk indicates that p<0.01. (The
p-value of the overall model (given in the caption) should be
interpreted slightly differently than usual when describing a
SEM model; higher is better, and a satisfactory model has a
p-value of greater than 0.05.)
In summary, the main findings are:
• Consistently strong relationship, predictably, between be-
ing high profile (in terms of being searched on) and re-
ceiving a lot of tweets;
• MPs who receive more tweets receive more abuse;
• But having abstracted that out, there is a variable rela-
tionship between being high profile and receiving abuse.
Being famous per se doesn’t draw abuse;
• Engaging on Twitter consistently leads to receiving more
tweets;
• Being female consistently leads to receiving less abuse.
Abuse over Time
Harold Wilson once famously said that “a week is a long
time in politics” and this seems especially true for the re-
cent Brexit discussions, where a lot can change even within
a single day. As such looking at month long periods may
well hide interesting variations in the level of abuse MPs re-
ceived. To this end, for each month we’ve also calculated
the level of abuse received by all MPs each day and plot-
ted that as four line graphs. It is clear from these graphs that
the level of abuse MPs receive fluctuates daily, and it is not
always clear why this might be. On some occasions though
there are very suggestive links to important events.
In 2017, shown in figure 9, the two tallest spikes in abuse
level focus around firstly the Manchester Arena bombing on
Date Tot. Ab. % Ab.
2015 3,136,352 19,094 0.609
2017 4,639,050 39,078 0.842
2018 4,738,168 60,110 1.269
2019 4,561,468 55,372 1.214
Table 6: Statistics for entire dataset
the evening of the 22nd of May (the abuse peaks on the fol-
lowing day) and again around the 3rd and 4th of June after
the London Bridge attack.
Figure 10 gives the late 2018 period. On the 25th of
November 2018 the EU endorses the Brexit withdrawal
agreement and abuse aimed at British MPs immediately
starts to climb reaching a peak a few days later on the 28th
of November which saw the first PMQs after the agreement
was announced.
In the final period in 2019, shown in figure 11, the wide
peak starts to build on the 16th of January, the day the gov-
ernment survived a no confidence vote, peaking three days
later on the 19th.
Topics which Attract Abuse
We now turn to the topics motivating abusive tweets to
politicians, across the four time periods. Abusive tweets
were compared against the set of predetermined topics de-
scribed earlier. Words relating to these topics were then used
to determine the level of interest in these topics among the
abusive tweets, in order to gain an idea of what the abusive
tweeters were concerned about. So for example, the follow-
ing paraphrased 2017 tweet is counted as one for “borders
and immigration” and one for “schools”: “Mass immigra-
tion is ruining schools, you dick. We can’t afford the inter-
pretation bill.”
We consider abuse related to specific topics both within
the dataset as a whole, as well as in relation to what topics
lead to abusive replies to MPs. Not every tweet contains a
recognised topic, so for this analysis we are only using the
tweets that do have a topic mentioned in them. The topic ti-
tles used in this section are generally self-explanatory, but a
few require clarification. “Community and society” refers to
issues pertaining to minorities and inclusion, and includes
religious groups and different sexual identities. “Democ-
racy” includes references to the workings of political power,
such as “eurocrats”. “National security” mainly refers to ter-
rorism, where “crime and policing” does not include terror-
ism. The topic of “public health” in the UK is dominated by
the National Health Service (NHS). “Welfare” is about en-
titlement to financial relief such as disability allowance and
unemployment cover.
Topics in the whole dataset This subsection is the first
time in this work that we make use of the entire dataset,
rather than just tweets to sitting MPs. Table 6 contains statis-
tics for this corpus. You can see the percentage of abusive
tweets in each of the time periods. This is notably lower than
for the tweets only to MPs.
In this analysis we use only the tweets that mention a
Figure 7: SEM models for the four periods
Figure 8: Abuse Timeline 2015
topic. In table 7 you can see how many that is–roughly
one third to a half of tweets mention at least one of the se-
lected topics. Total numbers of original tweets, replies and
retweets are given. In this section we use, at different points,
all retweets that have a topic mention, and abusive replies
to all politicians in the dataset (not just sitting MPs but also
candidates, and MPs from other time periods). For this rea-
son, in the table below, in addition to breaking down the total
number into original tweets, replies and retweets, we also in-
clude information about the number of replies to politicians
that are abusive. These are relatively small in number.
Next, we examine which topics featured most in abusive
replies to politicians over the respective time periods and
compare these to the topics that elicited engagement through
Figure 9: Abuse Timeline 2017
retweets.
What the stacked bar charts in figures 12 and 13 clearly
show is the rise of Brexit and Europe as topics that trigger
online abuse and political debate. In 2015 Brexit did not ap-
pear within the top 9 topics, as it was well before the refer-
endum date had even been set. Likewise, the related topic of
Europe, which concerns EU, EC, and MEPs, attracted less
than 4% of retweets and did not feature amongst the top 9
topics in abusive replies. By the 2019 period, however, over
a quarter of all retweets with a topic are about Brexit and
over 17% are about Europe, with the same trend observed
in abusive replies. This clearly demonstrates how Brexit and
Europe have come to dominate political discourse, as the
primary topics of engagement with MPs, polarised debates
Date All tweets Original tweets Reply tweets to politicians Retweets
Total Total Total Abusive % Abusive Total
2015 1,013,679 63,329 192,906 2,426 1.258 757,444
2017 1,819,657 44,286 296,233 6,562 2.215 1,479,138
2018 2,590,070 40,661 466,240 11,242 2.411 2,083,169
2019 2,507,191 39,218 475,344 11,112 2.338 1,992,629
Table 7: Subset of entire dataset that contains a topic mention
Figure 10: Abuse Timeline 2018
Figure 11: Abuse Timeline 2019
and online abuse.
It is notable that in 2017 national security comes to the
fore in abuse-containing tweets, whilst only being the ninth
most prominent topic in the retweets. Similarly, community
and society is more frequent in abuse-containing tweets than
in the retweets. In the month preceding the 2017 election, the
UK witnessed its two deadliest terrorist attacks of the decade
so far, both attributed to ISIS. In 2015 economy is the most
prominent topic in abusive tweets and a very close second
in the retweets. National security was not an important topic
in 2015. However, borders and immigration appears more
prominently in the abuse-containing tweets.
The heat map charts in figures 14, 15 and 16 illustrate
which topics attracted more abuse than is typical for the
tweets from that period, or less abuse than is typical, for
each time period. This is done by comparing the proportion
of tweets on a particular topic that are abusive with the pro-
portion of the entire dataset that is abusive, using Fisher’s
exact test. A dark red block indicates that that topic in that
year attracted very significantly more abuse than the back-
Figure 12: Topics in Abusive Replies to Politicians
Figure 13: Topics in All Retweets containing a Topic Men-
tion
ground distribution (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.01). Light red
indicates a result significant at p<0.05. Light green indicates
that that topic attracts less abuse than average for the corpus
(p<0.05) and dark green indicates that that topic in that time
period attracted very significantly less abuse (p<0.01). Note
that the significance of the difference between incivility in
tweets on the topic and the background, shown using colour
in the heat map, does not indicate the magnitude of the dif-
ference. Numbers in the cells therefore give firstly the per-
centage of topic mentions in abusive tweets, and secondly
the percentage of topic mentions in non-abusive tweets.
We can see that some topics have consistently attracted
abuse (table 14): borders and immigration; crime; defence;
and national security (terrorism). Others have tended to in-
vite a civil tone, or at least fail to invite an abusive one (ta-
ble 16): children; the environment; the economy; business;
Northern Ireland; and Wales. Topics with no significant dif-
ferences from the background distribution have also been
included in this table.
Several topics show variation and possibly an evolution
over time in the civility of discussion attracted (table 15).
In particular, we note that the Brexit discussion in 2017 was
uncivil, but by the 2018 and 2019 periods it had become
civil. There is a suggestion of a “2017 effect”, in that often
it is the 2017 time period that shows a different response to
that topic than usual. In 2017:
• “Brexit”, “community and society” and “rural and coun-
tryside” attracted unusually abusive attention;
• “Employment”, “pensions and ageing society”, “tax and
revenue” and “welfare” attracted unusually civil attention.
It is possible that issues that normally inspire impassioned
Figure 14: Topics attracting more abuse than is typical (%)
Figure 15: Topics that vary in abuse attracted (%)
Figure 16: Topics attracting less abuse than is typical (%)
feeling were displaced from the public consciousness in the
wake of the referendum, when Brexit itself and matters of
community and belonging were brought to the fore. “Rural
and countryside” issues are highly relevant in the context of
Brexit. “International aid and development” and “schools”
don’t fit a 2017 pattern.
Topics which Drive Abusive Replies The above analy-
sis focuses purely on the topics of the retweets and abusive
replies to politicians across the entire dataset. Next, we ex-
amine variations in abuse topics at a party level. The charts
below focus only on the three main parties as they receive
large enough volumes of abusive replies to give meaningful
results.
This analysis differs from that in the previous section as
it looks at the original tweets written by MPs in conjunction
with the replies they receive. As with previous analysis we
start by collecting all the abusive replies sent to MPs, but we
use them only as a stepping stone to find the tweets an MP
sent to which they were in reply. These original MP tweets
are then processed to determine which topics they contain.
The idea is to see if tweets on different topics results in the
differing levels of abusive replies.
We present this analysis in the following four graphs (one
per time period) in which we display the top nine topics
that triggered abusive replies, and the remaining tweets are
grouped under other (this is done not in an attempt to hide
the other topics but simply to make the graphs readable). For
example, looking at the graph for 2015 we can see that just
under 20% of the abusive replies to Conservative MPs were
triggered by the MP tweeting about employment, whereas
Figure 17: Topics in abuse in replies to politicians of differ-
ent parties: 2015
just over 20% of the replies to Labour were in response to
tweets by their MPs on the topic of welfare.
Again these graphs show that in 2018 and 2019 for the
two main parties (Conservatives and Labour) Brexit and
the wider topic of Europe are the primary focus of abu-
sive replies. In comparison, in 2015 the topic of Europe
was not amongst the most prominent topics of abuse (em-
ployment, business, economy, public health, etc), whereas
in 2017 Brexit appears as a topic only for the conservative
party.
Subjects attracting ire differ between parties, and may
give an indication of how the party (or its key personnel)
are viewed. Employment has arisen in the top topics for the
Conservative party twice, but not Labour. Crime and polic-
ing has arisen twice in top topics for the Labour party, but
no other. It is striking that tweets about borders and immi-
gration drew abusive responses for the Liberal Democrats in
2017, but don’t appear in top topics for any other party or
time period, given that borders and immigration is a promi-
nent topic in abusive tweets. Similarly, tweets about na-
tional security drew more abusive replies proportionally for
the Liberal Democrats in 2017 than for the Conservatives,
whilst national security doesn’t feature among top topics for
Labour. The tone of Liberal Democrat tweeting regarding
immigration and terrorism was unambiguously left-wing,
whereas Labour tended to focus on criticizing the Conser-
vative Party whilst hedging about their own position.
How Abusive Words are Used
In this section we present some exploration into how words
are used. We start with work on how women and men are
differently addressed, before turning to trends in word use
Figure 18: Topics in abuse in replies to politicians of differ-
ent parties: 2017
Figure 19: Topics in abuse in replies to politicians of differ-
ent parties: 2018
Figure 20: Topics in abuse in replies to politicians of differ-
ent parties: 2019
over time.
Words used differently towards male and female MPs
In table 8, Fisher’s exact test was used to establish if a word
is significantly more often used in a tweet to a female or a
male MP, as a proportion of all abuse terms found in tweets
to that group. (This may occasionally mean that a word ap-
pears on the female list because it is used unexpectedly fre-
quently given that women receive less abuse, even though
it may be similarly or more frequently used against male
MPs on a per-individual basis.) Only abuse terms that appear
more than 500 times across all the years/genders combined
are included in the table. Stronger words, selected according
to the Ofcom guide27 or in keeping with it, are indicated in
bold.
The impression given by the table reinforces the above
finding that men tend to receive more abuse, with the sug-
gestion of a richer vocabulary of insults being targeted to a
greater extent at men. Even terms that need not technically
be considered gendered, such as “bastard” and “git”, still
suggest a male target through routine usage, making them
hard to classify. It is notable however that women are more
likely to be addressed with “fuck off”, or “fuck you” (as a
proportion of all abuse words received), phrases which are
perhaps unified by being expressions of aggression, and by
the words “scum” and “turd”, which might be thought of as
“dirt” words.
The bar chart in figure 21 gives an indication in quanti-
tative terms of which abuse words are being used in tweets
27https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0022/91624/OfcomOffensiveLanguage.
pdf
Word group Levelled More Levelled More No
at Female MPs than at Male MPs than significant
Male (p<0.01) Female (p<0.01) difference
Gendered ’witch’, ’slag’, ’wanker’, ’bastard’,
’bitch’ ’tosser’, ’dickhead’
Fem bdy pt ’cunt’, ’twat’, ’tit’ ’twats’
as insult
Male bdy pt ’prick’, ’dick’,
as insult ’bellend’, ’plonker’
Reference to ’loony’ ’muppet’, ’you idiot’, ’cretin’, ’idiot’,
intelligence ’fuckwit’, ’pillock’, ’moron’
’numpty’
Ref. to dirt ’scum’, ’turd’ ’scumbag’
Aggression ’fuck off’, ’fuck you’ ’stfu’
Other ’coward’, ’git’, ’prat’, ’pish’
’your arse’ (p<0.05) ’arsehole’
Table 8: Abuse Words Used Differently Toward Women and
Men MPs
Figure 21: Top 20 Abuse Words, Instances per MP
to male and female MPs (the table above gives significant
differences but not an idea of the extent of word use or how
male-female experience differs in absolute terms). The y-
axis gives counts of this term being used per person, aver-
aged over the four time periods, for the 20 most used abuse
terms. So, for example, on average a woman MP might ex-
pect to be addressed with “idiot” six times in any one time
period (though note that abuse does not spread itself in a nor-
mal distribution, so “average” is not a usual case, most MPs
receiving less than that, and a few much more).
Strength of language used against male and female MPs
Words were again classified according to Ofcom’s guide to
degree of offensiveness.28 Where a word was not found in
the guide, it was classified in a way that was in keeping
with the guide, if this could be cautiously done (for exam-
ple “fuckwit” was considered ”strongest” because Ofcom
positions “fuck” in the strongest category). Spelling varia-
tions were also considered, as well as pluralization. Words
not included in Ofcom or very similar to words included
were excluded from this analysis. Words were then grouped
into two categories; mild/medium and strong/strongest, and
28https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0022/91624/OfcomOffensiveLanguage.
pdf
Figure 22: Abuse Words over Time (Proportion of Total for
Year)
male and female scores compared for the two groups. Where
words were classified into binary male/female categories ac-
cording to whether men or women were more targeted by
that word as a percentage of total abuse received by that
group, women are significantly more likely to be targeted
with milder words (t-test, p<0.05). Where the test was per-
formed on the absolute difference between the words as a
percentage of total abuse received by men and women, again
women were significantly more likely to be targeted with
milder words (t-test, p<0.05). Where the difference was cal-
culated between the average number of times a woman was
targeted with that word in contrast to a man, the pattern still
holds but the statistical significance is weaker (p<0.1). In
summary, there is some evidence that milder words are used
against women compared with men.
Word usage change across time Over time, there is more
change in abuse term usage between 2015 and 2017, and
between 2017 and 2018. Between 2018 and 2019 periods
little time elapsed, and consequently most changes in abuse
term usage are not significant. The ten most common abuse
words across the four time periods are plotted in figure 22,
in terms of the proportion of abuse words in that time period
(e.g. 17% of the abuse in 2015 was “fuck off”).
There is a suggestion of a trend over time towards milder
abuse words. Note for example that “fuck off” has de-
clined, whilst “idiot” has risen. In order to test this, words
were again grouped according to Ofcom’s guide to de-
gree of offensiveness into two categories; mild/medium and
strong/strongest. The rise and fall of the terms was calcu-
lated in terms of the change in proportion of total abuse
words used in that year between time periods (for example,
“your arse” declined from 1.4% in 2015 to 1% in 2017, giv-
ing -0.4%). These change figures were then compared for the
two word groups using a t-test. Generally speaking, milder
words rose and stronger words declined, except for between
2018 and 2019, where the time elapsed was short. The dif-
ference between groups was statistically significant between
2017 and 2018 (p<0.05). Whilst not statistically significant,
the change between 2015 and 2017 and the overall change
between 2015 and 2019 was in keeping with the trend de-
scribed.
It may be that awareness has increased and/or attitudes
have changed, or it may be that users hope to avoid sanctions
from Twitter, resulting in an increase in use of milder words
such as ”idiot” and a decrease in stronger words/phrases
such as “fuck off” and “cunt”, as illustrated in the chart
above.
Discussion and Future Work
We describe how abusive language was used in tweets to
British MPs in four separate month-long time periods; pre-
ceding general elections in 2015 and 2017, and around key
decision points in the negotiation of the United Kingdom’s
exit from the European Union late 2018 and early 2019. The
data show what politicians contend with in terms of abusive
attention on Twitter, and how variable this between individ-
uals with different public roles and reputations.
We find that the topics that draw abuse evolve over the
period studied. We see the appearance of “Brexit” as the
main focus of attention both in abusive tweets and gener-
ally, drawing attention from the previously strong focus of
public health (the NHS). Among abusive tweets, Brexit has
captured attention previously focused to a greater extent on
borders and immigration. In the wake of the referendum, na-
tional security (terrorism) drew abusive attention in a way
not seen in any other period or in a non-abusive tweets.
The 2017 period preceded a general election uniquely fo-
cused on Brexit, as Theresa May sought to strengthen her ne-
gotiation position. In various ways, the focus of attention in
that time period differed from the others. The topic of Brexit
itself attracted unusually abusive attention, as did “commu-
nity and society”, a topic that includes, most relevantly, re-
ligious identities. After that period, the tone of conversation
about Brexit and about identity groups became civil. Recall
that there were two terrorist attacks attributed to ISIS in the
UK in the month preceding the 2017 general election, whilst
the threat level from ISIS has dropped considerably since.
With regards to the relationship between demographic
characteristics and abuse, much depends on individual char-
acteristics such as an individual’s being outspoken on certain
topics. Being prominent per se doesn’t particularly attract
abuse, but more prominent individuals will draw more atten-
tion on Twitter, and therefore more abuse by volume. Whilst
Conservatives seem to attract more abuse, this effect is lost
when prominence is factored out. However, female gender
does seem to lead to less abuse by proportion in quantitative
terms. There is also some evidence that women are subjected
to less strong abuse. However, they were more likely to be
addressed using the “f” word and words suggesting dirt.
The finding regarding women receiving less abuse is in
keeping with findings across a more general population (Pew
2014), though Pew find women in the 18-24 age range are
disproportionately targeted, whilst there are no women of
that age range in our sample. The reader should also note
that words mean different things depending on who is ad-
dressed, and quantitative findings do not address the full
complexity of society. Abuse might be received very differ-
ently, for example, by a person who is more physically or so-
cially vulnerable, or where it attacks a person’s right to take
their place in the political arena. Furthermore our approach
lumps abuse together. It may be that a general tendency to
address women somewhat more politely masks a sinister mi-
nority of more unpleasant abuse. Most of the abuse in our
sample arises from individuals expressing a strength of feel-
ing about political matters, which isn’t personal. We don’t
present data here about the specific demographics of per-
sonal abuse, threats, bullying or persecution.
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